In Sunni doctrine, the Caliph (in Arabic khalifa, meaning successor) is the successor to the Prophet Muhammad, and the religious and secular leader of the Islamic community. Appointment as Caliph comes about as a result of a contract between a candidate who possesses the required qualifications for office, and one or more "men of loosing and binding." The list of qualifications varies from author to author, but always includes descent from the Quraysh, the Prophet's tribe, and effective leadership in war. This theory was formed by theologians in the ninth and tenth centuries and remained fixed in its essentials. Later theorists, however, had to accommodate the fact that the titular Caliphs -the 'Abbasids of Baghdad -had lost most of their authority to rival dynasties. Mawardi (d. 1058) achieved this by claiming that the new dynasties that had arisen ruled by virtue of a delegation of powers from the 'Abbasids. Ghazali (d. 1111) achieved it by claiming that a necessary qualification for the Caliphate was power, and that the 'Abbasids possessed this by virtue of the support of the "Turks"meaning the Saljuqs -the de facto ruling dynasty in Baghdad. Theories of the Caliphate, it should be added, are found in works discussing religious dogma ('aqa'id) and not in works of jurisprudence, despite their quasi-juristic formulation.
So much for the theory. More important in people's minds was the historical resonance of the Caliphate, recalling as it did the memory of the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs who succeeded the Prophet, and of the 'Abbasid Caliphs established in Baghdad from 750 until the Mongol conquest in 1258. After the downfall of the Baghdad Caliphate, theologians no longer wrestled with the problem of how to reconcile the classical theory with current reality, Taftazani (d. 1389), for example, commenting merely that problem of the Caliphate had become difficult. Instead, the title Caliph became a rhetorical device which rulers might add to their list of honorifics with no function beyond sounding impressive. The term also enjoyed a more widespread usage, notably among the Sufi orders (tariqas), whose leaders sometimes adopted titles -for example, sultan or chelebi (prince) -which mimicked the hierarchies of secular government. Their followers and later hagiographers might also claim for them spiritual -and, very occasionally, secular -ascendancy over the ruling sultan.
A list of honorifics attributed to Mehmed I (1413-21) is the first recorded instance of Caliph as the title of an Ottoman Sultan. However, it was Süleyman I (1520-66) who first adopted the title -Caliph of the Messenger of the Lord of the Worlds -in an attempt to claim general sovereignty over the Muslim world, and probably in direct competition with the parallel Christian claim of his rival, the Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V.
I felt it necessary to offer this brief account of the Caliphate because although the title of this book is Caliphate Redefined: The Mystical Turn in Ottoman Political Thought, the author never actually defines -let alone re-defineswhat the Caliphate is. Nor does he define the beliefs of the Sufis who were apparently doing the re-defining, so that when, for example, he refers to Idris of Bitlis as a "Sufi-minded jurist," it is difficult to see what he means (179). Had he, in fact, given us clear definitions of his terms and concepts at the outset, the book as a whole would have made more sense. He would, for example, have noticed that the deposed Grand Vizier Lutfi Pasha's Khalas al-Umma -discussed in several places -is a defence of Süleyman I's claim to the Caliphate, despite his not being descended from the Quraysh. The Ottoman genealogy had been created in the fifteenth century before the Ottoman sultans had made any serious claim to the Caliphate, which is why the problem of Qurayshi descent was to arise in the sixteenth when Süleyman I laid claim to the title. This is rather an obvious point, but one (of many) that Yılmaz has missed. The genealogy which gives a noble Turkish, rather a Qurayshi, descent was the creation of Murad II (1421-51), who is nonetheless described here as having the image of a "caliph and learned ruler" (130). To make another rather obvious point, throughout the book the author contrasts the Sufi view of the Caliphate with the juristic view. However, a passing knowledge of Islamic juristic literature should make it clear that jurists very rarely mention the Caliph and, in fact, never discuss the question of what makes a legitimate ruler except when forced to by the subject under discussion.
The book, it has to be said, quotes an awe-inspiring range of sources. The problem, however, is that the summaries that the author gives of their contents makes it clear that he has, at best, skimmed them, leaving the reader with little idea of their contents or context. In one place, he gives, as an example, a "long and systematic treatise . . . on imperial ideology and guiding principles of government," Muhammnad al-Siddiqi's al-Minah al-rahmaniyya, which is actually an Arabic chronicle of the Ottoman Empire, focussing on Egypt. He has also missed some obviously relevant works (220, 320n). For example, he makes numerous references to al-Ghazali, but has altogether missed al-Ghazali's theory of the Caliphate. And speaking of context, the author's grasp of relevant historical details is shaky. The rebellion and execution of Bedreddin of Simavne, for example, happened in 1416, not 1420, and the rebellion did not take "seven years to suppress" (128). The careless writing style of the book matches its unfocussed and often misleading contents. Phrases such as "a slew of bureaucrats well versed in the Persianate ideals on government" make one wonder who these "bureaucrats" actually were (136). Occasionally, however, the author's turns of phrase do make for light relief. "The ascendance of spiritualism across all sectors of the Ottoman establishment" makes one think of ectoplasms (218). The richly illustrated book, Mapping in the Middle East, both continues and expands historian Zayde Antrim's exploration of Middle Eastern notions of belonging and ways of thinking about space that she initiated in her first monograph, Routes and Realms (2012) . Recounting Middle Eastern mapping "from the inside," before European hegemony, her new work is an inclusive one, comprising all that pertains to the geographical imagination, from Islamic manuscripts to contemporary art works. It also ambitiously covers some thousand years of mapping practices from the eleventh to the twenty-first centuries, within a space that stretches from "the Atlantic Ocean to the Oxus and Indus river valleys" (13). The work is organized chronologically, successively examining pre-Ottoman Arabic and Persian (tenth to fifteenth centuries); Ottoman (sixteenth to eighteenth centuries); late-Ottoman (late eighteenth to early twentieth centuries); and post-Ottoman (twentieth to twenty-first centuries) mapping, the last chapter acting as conclusion.
Antrim persuasively and systematically argues that a thousand years of mapping within the space that more or less corresponds to today's Middle East, produced a vision of the world that was defined by connectivity, mobility, overlap, inclusion, porosity and contiguity. Middle Eastern concepts of space and identity thus contrasted with the notions that appeared in seventeenth-century Europe, and that came to dominate the field of our present geographical imagination. Indeed, Europeans produced segmented, continental representations of the world that demarcated political and cultural divisions, asserted ethno-racial distinctions, and functioned as a means of
